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UKIP 
 
Abstract  
This paper considers the rise of UKIP and the mainstream parties’ reaction to its stance on 
immigration. This paper accordingly seeks to examine the specific themes contained within 
the rhetoric of the mainstream political party leader speeches conveyed between September 
2013 and December 2014 in order to ascertain the underlying messages being employed 
regarding immigration – a key UK 2015 election campaigning topic. This examination will 
entail a comparative analysis of speeches conveyed by the leaders of the Liberal Democrat, 
Conservative, Labour Party and UKIP leaders. Combining two forms of discourse – Benoit’s 
(2007) functional theory and Wodak and Meyer’s (2015) analysis of ideology and political 
discourse, this study addresses the following research question: How have the mainstream 
political parties responded to UKIP’s challenge on immigration as part of their political 
communication?  The results of the analysis provide fresh insights regarding the use of 
message themes, namely acclaims, attacks, defences, policy and character, in the treatment of 
the question of immigration by mainstream political parties, including UKIP.  
Key words: General British Elections, immigration, political communication, functional 
analysis, critical discourse analysis 
 
“All the parties now talk tough on immigration” (Nigel Farage, 20th September 2013) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its foundation in 1993 the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has steadily 
increased its European election support from 7% in 1999 to 27.5% in 2014 (Hunt, 2014). 
Such growth, however, had not been reflected in UK national elections where UKIP has 
historically failed to make an electoral breakthrough. For example, in the 2001 UK General 
Election UKIP acquired 1.5% of total votes and in 2010 this figure marginally increased to 
3.2% (Hunt, 2014). This trend reversed in 2014. A recent surge in UKIP support, epitomised 
by successes in the 2014 European election and the appointment of its first parliamentary 
member – Douglas Carswell - following the Clacton by-election, has highlighted the 
broadening appeal of UKIP to many voters. It would appear that UKIP’s combination of 
populism, euroscepticism and anti-immigration policies has resonated with an electorate who 
is disenchanted with mainstream politics (Gouliamos et al., 2013; Savigny & Temple, 2010). 
 
UKIP’s growth has not been without incident. Internal disputes regarding UKIP’s direction 
has resulted in leadership challenges, notably Kilroy-Silk’s campaign in 2004 (Abedi & 
Lundberg, 2009) as well as a number of party leaders: Farage (2006-2009), Pearson (2009-
2010), and Farage (2010 – present). Despite its unstable background UKIP is increasingly 
regarded as a major threat to the first past the post political landscape (Roberts, 2014), 
appealing to “voters disconnected  from mainstream politics [who] share several key  
attitudinal features – in particular populism and anti-immigrant hostility” (Ford et al., 2012: 
205). As Robinson (2014) observed “British politics is now a national contest between at 
least four parties – Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and UKIP.” 
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This paper accordingly seeks to examine the specific themes contained within the rhetoric of 
the mainstream political party leader speeches conveyed between September 2013 and 
December 2014 in order to ascertain the underlying messages being employed regarding 
immigration – a key UK 2015 electoral campaigning topic. This examination will entail a 
comparative analysis of speeches conveyed by the leaders of the Liberal Democrat, 
Conservative, Labour and UKIP political parties. Combining two forms of discourse – 
Benoit’s (2007) functional theory and Wodak’s (2001) analysis of ideology and political 
discourse - this study addresses the following research question: How have the mainstream 
political parties responded to UKIP’s challenge on immigration as part of their political 
communication?   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
UKIP and Immigration  
UKIP has been studied in a variety of contexts, notably its populist nature (Brett, 2013), the 
adoption of civic narratives by UK right wing parties (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2010), 
euroscepticism and xenophobia (Breed, 2013; Ford, et al. 2012), organisational challenges 
(Abedi & Lundberg, 2009) and voting patterns (John & Margetts, 2009; Lynch, et al. 2011). 
Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) recent investigation of UKIP likewise highlighted three 
motivations for supporting the party: 1) antipathy towards Europe; 2) resentment about 
immigration, and 3) dislike of the UK political system as a whole. The topic of immigration 
has been a sensitive topic for mainstream parties who therefore need to address the issue in 
convincing terms, and yet avoid accusations of populism, if not racism. According to Duffy 
and Frere-Smith (2014), the role of immigration has been pivotal to UKIP’s recent success in 
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elections. They also show a consistent dissatisfaction amongst the majority of citizens with 
governments’ (of any colour) handling of immigration (Duffy & Frere-Smith, 2014).  
Extreme-right parties have been traditionally the most vocal opponents of immigration 
(Mudde, 2007), but today, the issue of immigration is no longer their exclusive domain. 
Many mainstream political parties across Europe have reclaimed immigration as their own 
issue, as it is considered a sure vote-winner in a climate of growing unemployment and 
economic crisis (Lim & Moufahim, 2011:658). Whilst there is a large body of literature on 
the rise of populist parties in the West (for example: Akkerman, et al. 2014; Art, 2007; 
Mudde, 2007, 2013; Schedler, 1996), the reaction of mainstream parties to, for example 
UKIP, has been more limited. Wagner’s (2012) research indicated that political parties select 
their policy position strategically. Certainly, due to the competitive environment in which 
political parties operate, early research by Downs (1957) and Grofman (2004) asserted that 
parties would converge on sometimes non-centrist positions in order to increase their 
ideological distinctiveness in the eyes of the voters (Spoon, 2009). Subsequent research by 
Meyer and Wagner (2013) showed that all parties adjust the issues they address in the face of 
competition from other parties (it is acknowledged that there is a considerable body of 
literature in the area of issue ownership – notably the theory developed by Petrocik (1996)). 
Lancee and Schaeffer (2014) and Pardos-Prado’s et al. (2014) research meanwhile indicated 
that in general left wing parties are better keeping immigration off the agenda whilst right 
wing parties are better keeping it on. Interestingly, Bale (2014) argues that Labour did not 
just react to UKIP with regard to immigration, but had actually had it on the agenda for some 
time.  According to Tournier-Sol (2015), UKIP is forcing the Conservatives especially, to 
change their policies on immigration and Europe.  The emphasis on the Conservatives and 
their need to react is echoed by the work of Webb and Bale (2014), who consider that it is 
current Conservative party members who are most likely to defect to UKIP.  
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Political Communication  
Underlying the topic of immigration is political communication, defined as a multi-
disciplinary approach to the transmission of political influence from government institutions 
to citizens’ voting behaviour (Miller & McKerrow, 2010). Lock and Harris (1996: 21) 
explain that political marketing “is concerned with communicating with party members, 
media and prospective sources of funding as well as the electorate”, making political 
communication a central function in political marketing (Newman, 1999). Political 
communication has generated significant research interest in recent years (see for example 
Hrbková & Zagrapan, 2014; Miller & McKerrow, 2010; Petithomme, 2010 and Stromback & 
Van Aelst, 2013), involving a range of communication tools used to convey a clear message 
to the electorate in order to win elections. Various facets of political communication have 
accordingly been investigated, including the importance of message differentiation (Kitschelt, 
1994; Lees-Marshment, et al. 2014; Spoon, 2009). The focus on the party leader’s political 
communication has also generated interesting insights (Scammell, 1995). The importance of 
leaders’ communications during election campaigns brings to the fore the concept of ‘valence 
politics’ (Clarke et al. 2004), which sheds light on contemporary party choice. Valence issues 
are those on “on which parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but by 
the degree to which they are linked in the public’s mind with conditions or goals or symbols 
of which almost everyone approves or disapproves” (Stokes, 1992:143). Arguably, politics is 
increasingly about so called valence issues, since the differences between the parties on 
position issues have become (or are perceived as) small (Denver, n.d.). In such scenario, 
voters make their decision based on who they think is likely to be most competent at 
achieving particular goals, such as reduced crime, a well-run health service (Denver, n.d.), 
and in our case, a ‘controlled’ level (if not a complete halt) of immigration.  As observed by 
Denver (n.d):  
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[V]oters, therefore, tend to use a convenient short cut. They make judgements about 
the party leaders. This is a much simpler task. We don’t need to know much about 
policies or politics to decide whether we like or dislike the party leaders that we see 
often enough on television […] Evaluations of, simple reactions to, party leaders have 
become increasingly used by voters as a shorthand way of making a decision about 
which party to support in elections. This has been encouraged by the rise of television 
as the primary means of political communication and the intense focus of the media 
on party leaders.  
 
Intriguingly relatively few studies have specifically focused on the actual discourse and 
rhetoric adopted by politicians to construct their identity, communicate their policy, reach 
consensus, and garner support (see for example Bos & Brants, 2014; Dean, 2005; Koc & 
Ilgun, 2010; Moufahim et al. 2007). This is surprising given that political organizations do 
extensively engage in persuasion processes with the general public, party members and other 
political parties. Such engagement is typically achieved via symbolic rhetoric contained in 
published articles, broadcasts, advertisements, websites, photographs, cartoons, and branded 
merchandise. Indeed, rhetorical and discursive analyses have contributed greatly to research 
in the field of management communication (Cheney, 1983; Livesey, 2002), business studies 
(Craig & Amernic, 2004; Hyland, 1998), organizational discourse (Heracleous, 2006), 
individual identity and organizations (Linstead, 2005), and political marketing (Dean, 2005; 
Moufahim et al. 2007). 
 
In line with this body of research, this paper seeks to further our understanding of the way in 
which politicians communicate with their voters, make their speeches persuasive and attempt 
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to position themselves vis-à-vis their political competitors through discourse, based on the 
problematic yet relevant topic of immigration. Although immigration is arguably a key 
ideological element for British parties’ political strategy, due to its complex and emotive 
public resonance, mainstream political parties have seemed, so far, to prefer to let the issue 
develop a life of its own (Lim & Moufahim, 2011: 660). Throughout the 2015 election 
campaign the topic of immigration was particularly salient (Economist/Ipsos MORI, 2015; 
Hanley, 2015), intensified by extensive media coverage.  
 
METHODOLOGY: Discourse Analysis 
In our study, ‘discourse’ refers to the whole process of social interaction (Fairclough, 1989: 
24). Discourse analysis (DA) investigates how language is used to say, do and be something 
(Gee, 2014). Through the analysis of the historical and social context, DA helps to 
understand how meanings are constructed and how a broader social reality is constructed, 
maintained and experienced by people (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).  The ability of DA to 
investigate “clashes between different versions of political truth” (Bartelson, 1995:4) is 
particularly useful in terms of populist parties such as UKIP whose political communication 
messages potentially differs from that of mainstream parties. Discourse analysis therefore 
provides an opportunity to gather rich insights regarding the political messages emanating 
from party officials, founded on perceptions of British identity (Røren & Todd, 2014). 
 
One of the most widely utilised and systematically tested theories of discourse analysis has 
been functional theory (Benoit, 2007). Functional theory perceives political campaign 
discourse as intrinsically instrumental - a means to acquire enough votes to win elections 
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(Isotalus, 2011). The instrumental nature of functional theory is reflected by its adoption of 
the following tenets:  
 
1. Voting is a comparative act. Individuals accordingly select from competing political 
candidates based on a comparative judgment (Benoit, et al. 2007, 2003).  
 
2. Candidates must differentiate themselves from opponents (Benoit, 2007).  
 
3. Political campaign messages permit candidates to differentiate themselves. Campaign 
messages are the principal means by which political candidates convey selected 
distinctions to the electorate (Benoit, 2007).  
 
4. Candidates generate voter preferences via acclaiming (commending their positive 
characteristics or their policy positions), attacking their opponents by highlighting an 
opponent’s adverse character or policy position, and defending (attempting to restore or 
prevent additional damage to a candidate’s perceived attractiveness to voters) (Benoit, 
2007; Benoit, et al., 2003; Benoit & Harthcock, 1999). Functional theory contends that 
these three functions represent an informal cost-benefit analysis whereby acclaims 
amplify a candidate’s benefits with few drawbacks (Brazeal & Benoit, 2001) whilst 
attacks enlarge an opponent’s costs, notably in terms of ‘negative political’ repercussions 
(Krupnikov, 2011) and defences reduce supposed costs within a political debate (Benoit 
& Klyukovski, 2006). For example, several studies (Benoit & Airne, 2005; Benoit & 
Harthcock, 1999) have highlighted the use of acclaims more frequently than attacks 
whilst attacks are used more frequently than defences, particularly by political challenges 
(Airne & Benoit, 2005; Benoit, 2007; Lau & Pomper, 2004). Furthermore, defensive 
tactics possess a number of potential disadvantages: 1) defending against attacks will 
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frequently take a candidate ‘off-message’ (Hrbková & Zagrapan, 2014); 2) defences may 
be perceived as reactive rather than proactive which may be construed by the electorate 
as a negative quality (Gruber & Bale, 2014) and 3) defending against an attack invariably 
involves identifying or notifying voters of a latent weakness (Benoit et al. 2010).  
 
5. Campaign discourse involves two topics: policy and character. Political candidates thus 
endeavour to influence voters by referencing the attractiveness of their policy (Hrbková & 
Zagrapan, 2014) and personal character image (Heppell & Hill, 2012; Isotalus, 2011). 
Such discourse, according to Benoit et al. (2003; 2007; 2010), typically involves three 
topics: a) past deeds of the candidate; b) future plans will typically involve proposals for 
policy action, and c) general goals and qualities such as leadership ability and ideals.  
 
6. A candidate must win a majority of the election votes. Whilst Benoit (2007) contends 
that this tenet is somewhat trivial it does highlight the focus of political candidates on 
those individuals who actually cast votes. As such political campaigns involve three 
goals: a) attracting the votes of independent or third party voters; b) discouraging existing 
party members from defecting or voting for the opposition, and c) alluring some members 
of the opposing party to defect (Benoit et al. 2003). 
 
Functional theory provides an effective means by which to categorise and analyse campaign 
statements, using themes as coding units (Benoit, 2007), in a more multifaceted way than 
many other analyses (Isotalus, 2011). A key advantage of functional discourse analysis is 
therefore its ability to be applied to a diverse range of political campaign messages, including 
political speeches (Benoit, 2007).  
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In addition, we have used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to deepen our understanding of 
issue construction in political speeches. In-depth CDA (Wodak & Meyer, 2015) 
complemented our functional discourse analyses by way of examining the notions of power, 
bias and ideology with are embedded in the treatment of the question of immigration by 
mainstream political parties, including UKIP.  
 
CDA explores the relationships between linguistic choices and social contexts   rather than 
treating language as a separate cognitive domain (Charteris-Black, 2014:123).  The purpose 
of CDA is to understand how public communication contributes to the ‘power’ that arises 
from connecting with audiences. (Charteris-Black, 2014: vxi). In other words, CDA seeks to 
unveil the hidden web of domination, power, discrimination, and control existing in language 
(Wodak, 2001). For example, it is through language that power relations are legitimised 
(Wodak, 2001).Within CDA there are different views on the relationship between language 
and society. We focus here on Wodak’s (2001) approach, which considers a socio-cognitive 
level in defining the relationship between language and society. This politico-linguistic 
approach to the analysis of speeches (Charteris-Black, 2014) facilitates the analysis and 
decoding of allusions typically concealed in such utterances by referring to background 
knowledge (Titscher et al. 2000). The discourse-historical approach (DHA), a key theoretical 
approach within CDA, was also applied to the study. DHA is based on the theory of text 
planning by means of which the intentions of the speakers and the extra-linguistic factors 
(such as the status of the participants, time and place, sociological and psychological 
characteristics) in text production are identified (Titscher et al. 2000). Those elements of 
socio-psychological, cognitive and linguistic levels are considered as essential in the text 
production (Titscher et al. 2000: 155).  
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Methods 
Due to the level of detail involved in discourse analysis, we have chosen to focus on four key 
speeches by the Conservative (David Cameron), Labour (Ed Miliband), Liberal Democrat 
(Nick Clegg) and UKIP (Nigel Farage) party leaders delivered between September 2013 – 
December  2014. These speeches, where the theme of immigration was central, provide a 
good illustration of discursive processes and strategies deployed by political leaders (for DA 
research focusing on a political party leader’s single speech or written editorial address see 
among others (Ajmi, 2014; Ali & Kazemian, 2015; Emad, 2011; Moufahim et al. 2007). 
 
In terms of context the Conservative speech (6062 words) was delivered in Rochester in 
November 2014, 7 days after UKIP won the by-election for Rochester and Strood. The 
Labour speech (991 words) was delivered on 15th December 2014 in Great Yarmouth, 
Norfolk - a Conservative marginal seat. The Liberal Democrat speech (3644 words) took 
place in London on 5th August 2014 during a press conference whilst the UKIP speech (3399 
words) was delivered at a party conference on 20
th
 September 2013). All speeches, despite 
variances in location and length, attempted to respond to UK media coverage of immigration. 
Each speech was analysed in detail using CDA (Fairclough et al. 2011; Wodak & Meyer, 
2015) and Benoit’s (2007) functional theory. 
 
A number of steps were undertaken to analyse the data.  Firstly, the candidate’s statements 
were unitized into coding themes, defined as “an assertion about a subject” (Berelson, 
1952:138). Such themes are based on thematic functions, namely acclaims, attacks and 
defences. Secondly, the topic of each coding theme was subsequently classified, based on 
policy or character. Thirdly, each theme was next analysed to determine which of the three 
forms of policy (past deeds, future plans and general goals) or the three forms of character 
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(personal qualities, leadership ability, ideals) was used in each theme. The final stage of the 
coding process involved a detailed comparison of each candidate’s themes designed to gain a 
better picture of what kind of utterances they included. During this final stage of functional 
theory analysis we deconstructed the identified themes using CDA. We focused in particular 
on: a) the semantic elements of discourse (i.e. the content or the topic); b) the strategies 
adopted to achieve determined aims and; c) the linguistic and forms of syntactical means used 
in the text (De Cillia et al. 1999). To keep a concise line of arguments, we elected to present 
the discursive and rhetorical strategies adopted by the candidates. We were particularly 
interested in what was said and how it was said. Central to our analysis is the identification of 
discursive strategies and topics (or topoi) that constitute the basis of how arguments are 
constructed (Charteris-Black, 2014:126) (for a full list of discursive strategies and topoi, see 
Meyer & Wodak, 2009). 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
We began our research by asking to what extent the mainstream political parties have adopted 
UKIP policy in terms of immigration as part of their marketing communications. This 
question was operationalised by determining how often the four political party leaders 
utilised each of three message themes, namely acclaims, attacks and defences.  
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Table 1- Coding themes 
 Acclaims Attacks Defences 
Nigel Farage (UKIP) 6 (20%) 18 (60%) 6 (20%) 
Ed Miliband (Labour) 5 (35.7%) 6 (42.9%) 3 (21.4%) 
David Cameron (Conservative) 12 (26.7%) 19 (42.2%) 14 (31.1%) 
Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat) 3 (25%) 5 (41.7%) 4 (33.3%) 
Total 26 (25.7%) 48 (47.5%) 27 (26.7%) 
 
Table 1 indicates that most themes utilised by each leader involved attacks (47.5%); defences 
(26.7%) and acclaims which were less frequent (25.7%). Compared to the other three leaders 
Nigel Farage frequently used attacks (60%) on the immigration policies of the three 
mainstream parties. This trend reflects prior research (Airne & Benoit, 2005; Lau & Pomper, 
2004) which highlights the proclivity of political challengers to attack incumbent’s record in 
office. The more limited amount of attacks made by Labour and the Liberal Democrats ties in 
with the comment by Pardos-Prado et al. (2014) regarding more left wing parties trying to 
keep immigration off the agenda. Both incumbent leaders – Nick Clegg (33.3%) and David 
Cameron (31.1%) – meanwhile defended themselves in terms of their immigration record. 
Such defensive tactics may result in number of disadvantages. As Benoit et al. (2010:108) 
observed “responding to an attack will usually take the candidate off-message; one must 
identify an attack to refute it and that identification may inform or remind voters of a 
potential weakness”.  
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The low number of acclaims consistently made by all political leaders is somewhat surprising 
given the lack of inherent drawbacks to this approach (Brazeal & Benoit, 2001) as well as the 
negative repercussions of ‘negative politics’ (Krupnikov, 2011). This trend may be explained 
by the unforeseen surge in UKIP and the topic of immigration in UK politics which has 
resulted in a somewhat ‘reactive’ response by incumbent parties (Adams et al. 2004; Gruber 
& Bale, 2014). 
 
With regards to campaign discourse, Table 2 outlines the relative frequency of discussion of 
policy and character in each leader speech. Table 2 indicates that 36.8% of the themes were 
based on future plans, closely followed by ideals (32.6%). The remaining discussion topics 
were markedly less frequent, namely leadership ability (13.7%), past deeds (7.4%), personal 
qualities (5.3%) and general goals (4.2%). In terms of specific leaders, Nigel Farage (UKIP) 
emphasised ideals in his speech (40.9%) whilst Ed Miliband (41.2%) and David Cameron 
(41.7%) discussed future plans. Nick Clegg’s comments were equally shared between future 
plans (35%) and ideals (35%). With the exception of Ed Miliband (17.6%) none of the other 
leaders noticeably discussed personal qualities. These findings correspond with the 
assumption of functional theory (Benoit, 2007) that policy will supersede the topic of 
character (Hrbková & Zagrapan, 2014). The reference to personal qualities by Ed Miliband 
may possibly represent a response to questions regarding his leadership of the Labour Party 
and his ability to be the Prime Minister (Heppell & Hill, 2012). Furthermore, Nick Clegg 
discussed past deeds (15%) far more than the other leaders. Such references coincide with 
Benoit’s et al. (2010:109) assertion that “the incumbent’s record is a resource from which 
incumbents can draw acclaims (highlighting successes).” 
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Table 2: Campaign Discourse 
Campaign Discourse 
 Policy Character 
Past 
Deeds 
Future 
Plans 
General 
Goals 
Personal 
Qualities 
Leadership 
Ability 
Ideals 
Farage  
 
2 (9.1%) 6 (27.3%) 1 (4.5%) 0 (0%) 4 (18.2%) 9 (40.9%) 
Miliband  
 
0 (%) 7 (41.2%) 1 (5.9%) 3 (17.6%) 2 (11.8%) 4 (23.5%) 
Cameron  
 
2 (5.6%) 15 (41.7%) 2 (5.6%) 1(2.8%) 5 (13.9%) 11 (30.6%) 
Clegg  
 
3 (15%) 7 (35%) 0 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 7 (35%) 
Total 
 
7 (7.4%) 35 (36.8%) 4 (4.2%) 5 (5.3%) 13 (13.7%) 31 (32.6%) 
The final stage of the data analysis process involved a comparison of each candidate’s themes 
designed to gain a better picture of what kind of utterances they included. Given the great 
level of detail typically expected in CDA, covering a discussion of historical and political 
context, discursive strategies, social practices and relations of power, and the rhetorical and 
linguistic analysis, we only present here the most salient findings to keep our argument 
concise. Such findings were based on a number of speech excerpts related to immigration in 
order to highlight the rhetorical and discursive strategies identified in the texts that frame the 
issue, the speaker, the party and their political opponent. All speeches, despite variances in 
location, attempted to respond to UK media coverage of immigration. 
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1. Ed Miliband - Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, 15th December 2014. 
Ed Miliband frames immigration as a legitimate area of concern, and in this way, protects the 
identity of his listeners by absolving them from any accusation of prejudice:  
When people worry about the real impact immigration has, this Labour 
Party will always respond to those concerns, not dismiss them. It isn’t 
prejudiced to worry about immigration, it is understandable.  
He also protects himself against potential accusations by presenting himself as a credible 
actor on the issue of immigration, since he is, himself, the son of immigrants:  
I am the son of immigrants, parents who came here as refugees fleeing from 
the Nazis.  
His pride over his immigrant parents is directly linked to the pride of all other immigrants’ 
contribution to Britain:  
And I am proud of the contribution that immigrants of all origins, races and 
faiths have made to Britain over the years.  
It allows him to position himself in the debate as a credible, yet human, leader and at the 
same time highlights his positive stance on immigration. The topos of justice (fairness and 
equality) is accordingly deployed in his treatment of immigration, which allows him to 
discursively construct 2 categories of actors: the typical construction of the ‘us vs. them’ 
strategy is here not between ‘native’ Britons and immigrants, but is about the workers vs. the 
‘privileged few’ i.e. the ruthless employers who take advantage of British workers (both 
native and immigrants).   
Above all, how we make Britain a country that works for everyday people 
again, and not just a privileged few, the richest in our country…There are 
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truly shocking stories of people in Britain today having their wages stolen 
and having to live in the most appalling conditions: exploited because they 
come here from abroad.  
The language used is simple, the sentences are short, and he does not provide lengthy 
explanations about his policy. He uses verbs which denote action and strength (‘we will stop’, 
‘we will act’, ‘we will introduce’, ‘I have been determined to change Labour’s approach to 
immigration’), and throughout his speech, he typically uses the active voice. This strength 
and reactivity to people’s concerns (which he shows as paralleling his own views) is evident:  
People want there to be control of immigration. And I agree. That means 
strengthening our borders, with proper entry and exit checks. And we will 
introduce those checks. 
While he does mention social benefits, his arguments are all about fairness. The topos of 
justice (fairness) appears as the dominant argument to justify his policies and beliefs 
regarding immigration. For example, the imposed control on immigration will be all about 
fairness to the local population, but also to the immigrants themselves that need to be 
protected from ruthless employers. The villains are clearly marked: ruthless employers and 
the Conservatives who are selling false promises to the electorate regarding their immigration 
cap.  
 
2. David Cameron - 28 November 2014  
In this speech, Cameron seems to activate emotions in the form of nationalist pride.  
When I think about what makes me proud to be British yes, it is our history, 
our values, our creativity, our compassion but there is something else too.  
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He goes on by explaining what makes Britain great, and why he is proud of it. Since he 
cannot himself claim an immigration history (like Miliband or Clegg), he uses the topos of 
history to show that Britain is a country of migrants with great achievements.   
We are Great Britain because of immigration, not in spite of 
it…Immigration benefits Britain. 
We have been able to easily detect an ‘identification strategy’ throughout the text. For 
example, Cameron uses ‘we’ and ‘our’ throughout his description of Britain’s stance vis-à-vis 
immigration and providing asylum for those in need. After presenting ‘historical’ 
immigration as a source of pride, Cameron continues by stating that ‘contemporary’ 
immigration is problematic, reflecting his association to this valence issue. He calls it “mass 
migration” or “high levels of migration”, which is considered by some as “an unavoidable 
by-product of a new world order of globalisation”. In the scenario he develops, mass 
immigration is directly linked (by juxtaposition in the text or so called semantic 
contamination) to a number of serious problems facing the British people: social housing, 
classroom overcrowding and communities changing “too fast”. He does not quite explain 
what he means by the latter. ‘Immigration as burden’ is a very common topos used by the 
critiques of immigration (Meyer & Wodak, 2009).  
He activates, this time, negative emotional appeals by echoing feelings of ‘anger’, 
‘frustration’ and ‘guilt’ experienced by people. Anger and guilt, in particular for those “dare 
to express their concerns”:  
And what makes everyone else really angry is that if they dare to express 
these concerns they can be made to feel guilty about doing so. 
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His perception of immigration is justified by his concerns over what ‘people’ feel and 
experience. The ‘people’ and an undefined ‘they’ dictate what the government should be 
doing. In this case, controlling immigration is what will save ‘our’ democracy:  
If we are to maintain this successful open meritocratic democracy we 
treasure, we have to maintain faith in government’s ability to control the 
rate at which people come to this country. 
Immigration is then clearly presented as a severe threat to the success of Britain as a 
meritocratic democracy. Using predication strategies (i.e. highlighting negative and positive 
traits), Britain is positively portrayed (its history, economy, democracy). Britain is 
constructed as an Eldorado which is appealing to many and which needs to be protected from 
freeloaders. 
That fact – combined with our generous welfare system, including for those 
in work – makes the UK a magnetic destination for workers from other 
European countries.  
In contrast, the issues facing Britain are all coming from outside: immigrants, the EU, 
globalisation, etc. To temperate such discourse (which is often typical of populist parties), 
Cameron goes on to highlight ‘internal’ shortcomings, such as the ‘generous welfare’ system 
and the current provision of education:  
Because the problem hasn’t just been a simplistic one of too many people 
coming here it’s also been too many British people untrained and too many 
British people without the incentive to work because they can get a better 
income living on benefits. 
Political opponents are negatively portrayed and criticised as prejudiced charlatans:  
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And any politician who doesn’t have a serious plan for welfare and 
education, has no sensible long-term plan for controlling immigration... We 
should distrust those who sell the snake oil of simple solutions.  
Cameron might be specifically targeting the UKIP with this statement, given UKIP’s main 
focus on immigration and their ‘straightforward’ solutions (but it should be noted that he does 
not name UKIP anywhere in his speech). Such criticisms also allow Cameron to position 
himself as reasoned and credible (i.e. what his opponents are not, He also directly mentions 
populist parties (but still without naming UKIP here) :  
But it has one common feature: [the issue of migration] is contributing to a 
corrosion of trust in the European Union and the rise of populist parties. 
After this rather negative tone, he shifts again to highlight the positive benefits of 
immigration, and how immigration is necessary for Britain (e.g. “They [British people] know 
that a modern, knowledge-based economy like ours needs immigration”). This allows him to 
introduce what is the ‘positive’ type of immigration: 1) ‘historical’ immigration, which has 
produced illustrious members of society, 2) his proposed ‘controlled’ immigration. These 
positive types of immigration are contrasted to ‘mass immigration’ which he rhetorically 
linked to issues such as the burden on public services. Interestingly, the demonising of mass 
immigration has been done 3 times, in sequences (alternating the good and the bad) 
throughout his speech. What one can take from the speech is that immigration is indeed a 
serious problem (topoi of danger and threat).  
The topos of justice is also used throughout to justify the stance vis-à-vis mass immigration 
and the proposed policies.   
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What it does mean is finding arrangements to allow a Member State like the 
UK to restore a sense of fairness and bring down the current spike in 
numbers…My objective is simple: to make our immigration system fairer 
and reduce the current exceptionally high level of migration from within the 
EU into the UK. 
In a careful balancing act, Cameron keeps oscillating in his speech between the positives and 
the negatives of immigration, providing facts, examples, and highlighting his own party’s 
positive achievements. The purpose of such exercises is certainly to avoid being seen as 
populist (especially as he directly mentions ‘people’, ‘they’, and uses patriotic appeals), and 
wants to be seen as a credible, rational leader offering diagnosis and solutions to this so-
called ‘valence issue’ facing Britain.  
The vocabulary used also reflects such an approach: tough vocabulary, verbs of action, and 
strong will, political conviction (e.g. “I stand by every word of that speech today”), 
communicating his leadership. We noted a limited use of the pronoun ‘I’, but when it is used 
it is often with a verb denoting strength and action: ‘I want’, I ‘simply don’t accept’, I ‘say’. 
The use of ‘we’ is more common to allow the inclusion (or community of interest and belief) 
between Cameron and his audience.  
 
3. Nick Clegg - 5th August 2014 
Nick Clegg presents his policy on immigration as a continuity of British history (through a 
topos of history):  
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We draw immense pride from living in a country which, throughout its 
history, has always said: if you come here, if you contribute, if you play 
your part, Britain will give you a chance.   
Clegg presents himself as resisting populism. In his case, he does directly name UKIP, and 
uses strong qualifiers:  
So I am never going to advocate pulling up the drawbridge because I think 
it’s what people want to hear. The Liberal Democrats are never going to 
mimic the likes of UKIP and others – the scaremongering, the immigrant-
bashing, the seductive promise that all our problems will disappear if only 
we shut up shop and stick a ‘closed’ sign on the door. 
He shows his distaste and tries to distance himself from the tactics of ‘others’:  
It wasn’t the Liberal Democrats who arranged for vans emblazoned with 
the words ‘Go Home’ to prowl around the streets of London. Had Jeremy 
Browne – the Liberal Democrat in the Home Office at the time – been 
consulted we would have put a stop to it then and there. 
In addition, he contrasts such actions with the achievement and humanity of the party who 
put an end to children’s incarceration (while harshly criticising the previous government):  
It was the Liberal Democrats, by contrast, who insisted that the Coalition’s 
Immigration Act include the outlawing of child detention: no more putting 
children stuck in the immigration system behind bars. Labour locked up 
thousands and thousands of little boys and girls every year.  
Clegg directly links his party (and himself) to values that would resonate with the audience, 
without developing them much as if they were self-explanatory: “Dignity. Compassion. Core 
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liberal values and core British values”. It allows the audience to ‘fill in the blanks’ and in 
this way he could appeal and reach consensus to a large audience in accordance to the 
valence issue of immigration. He also draws on a positive discourse of diversity:  
Yes, look across the country and you’ll see concerns over immigration and 
some concrete problems. But you’ll also see many non-Brits living and 
working side-by-side with British-born citizens as colleagues, neighbours, 
couples and friends.  
Like Miliband, Clegg referred to his own ‘diverse’ heritage to embed himself personally in 
the question of immigration:  
Our heritage is a glorious patchwork of different cultures and influences. 
My mother is Dutch. My father’s mother a Russian émigré. My wife, 
Spanish. I am like millions of British citizens whose roots can be traced 
around the globe. 
He likens himself to the British people, and that way allows them to identify to him, but also 
to show his empathy and understanding of their reality. The assumption here is that someone 
with his diverse background and family cannot be accused of populism and bigotry. He is 
framing himself as an expert of immigration, since he is ‘of immigration’. This identification 
strategy is even directly recognisable in his statement later in the speech, when he states: “I 
am like you”. He goes on by stating:  
So I do not accept that we are a closed society. I do not accept that we are 
condemned to the same trajectory we are witnessing across parts of 
Europe, where chauvinism and xenophobia are on the march.  
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Clegg accordingly leaves little room for insinuation, ambiguity, or multiple interpretations 
regarding his opinion about immigration. His style is direct (e.g. use of strong words: ‘I do 
not accept’). This closes the first part of his framing of immigration as positive. The second 
part uses the topoi of threat and danger to frame issues related to immigration problems and 
“threats they see to their way of life”, where his language is vaguer. He now talks about how 
‘other’ people feel, about ‘threats to a way of life’, without providing much detail about the 
nature of those threats. He simply states the existence of such threats (or the perception of 
threat by people). He also talks about: “Some of our communities have undergone huge 
change over what is, relatively, a very short space of time”, as did Cameron but did not 
expand on it either.     
He acknowledged people’s frustration, fear and resentment that arises as a result of a 
mismanaged immigration systems, and he does exonerate people of any accusation of racism 
as well (as did Miliband with ‘prejudice’), and this way legitimises the current discourse on 
the valence issue of immigration.  
As did Cameron, he constructs what constitute ‘good immigration’: historical immigration, 
and ‘smart’ immigration:  
That is smart immigration – encouraging high value investors to invest 
more money in the real economy for the sake of Britain. 
Immigration is described throughout as a system to be managed properly to ensure fairness 
(note: the topos has been identified in several places in Clegg’s discourse):  
We are finally getting to grips with the system; finally dealing with people’s 
concerns; finally building a system in line with our values – open hearted, 
generous spirited, but not open to abuse.  
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This framing of immigration as system gives it a veneer of rationality and efficiency. It 
allows the speaker to ‘sanitise’ the discourse from ideology. A system is neutral and works 
(or does not work) depending on input and regulations. This allows Clegg to distance himself 
further from populism, which he strongly condemned at the beginning of his speech. 
   
4. Nigel Farage - UKIP conference- 20 September 2013 
The first part of Farage’s speech is self-congratulatory. He attempts to draw the audience in 
and include them to the success of the party. He then moves to address the question of 
immigration:  
It’s the biggest single issue facing this country. It affects the economy. The 
NHS. Schools. Public services. The deficit…The effects are obvious. In 
every part of our national life. The strain these numbers are putting on 
public services. Schools. The shortage of school places in primaries and 
secondary schools. The NHS.  
By semantic contamination (i.e. textual juxtaposition), he links immigration to the major 
valence issues facing the UK. Contrarily to the other party leaders who started first by 
highlighting the positive contributions of immigration, he initially framed immigration as 
very negative for the country. He subsequently mentions his own positive stance vis-à-vis 
immigration and ‘migrants’:  
We are a nation that has always been open minded about immigration. But 
more people came to this country in one year, 2010 than came in the 
thousand years before it. I’m not against immigration. Far from it. 
Migrants have qualities we all admire. Looking for a better life. They want 
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to get on. I like that. We admire that. So I’m speaking here as much as for 
the settled ethnic minorities as for those who have been here forever.  
Interestingly, Farage still makes a difference between ‘native’ British (‘those who have been 
here forever’) and the ‘newer’ citizens, he calls ‘the settled ethnic minorities’). This is an 
interesting dichotomy that no other party has done. The topos of threat and the topos of 
numbers are prominent in his description of immigration:  
And from the 1
st
 of January next year, the risks increase massively. The 
seven year period is up and nearly 30 million of the good people of 
Bulgaria and Romania have open access to our country, our welfare system 
our jobs market…. 
Farage does distance himself from the controversial voices that came from among the UKIP 
ranks (i.e. a dis-identification strategy):  
We have some people with overactive Facebook accounts. And we have 
some who make public pronouncements that I would not always choose 
myself 
The most pressing issue for the party is to clearly distance himself from racism and from any 
association to more extreme expression of anti-immigration/anti-immigrants (such as the 
BNP’s) and he repeats himself to make the point stand out:  
We oppose racism. We oppose extremism…We are the only party that bans 
the BNP from membership. I’ve got a card here which says what UKIP is, 
and in the first line, it says as strongly and clearly as it can be said, UKIP 
opposes racism. UKIP is a free-thinking, egalitarian party opposed to 
racism, sectarianism and extremism. 
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UKIP uses the ‘voice of the silent majority’ is a common strategy of populist parties (see e.g. 
Moufahim et al. 2007), and there is evidence of such strategy throughout Farage’s speech:  
Half a million new arrivals a year! It’s just not sustainable. Anyone who 
looks at it honestly knows it’s not sustainable. UKIP talks about it honestly. 
Directly. We’ve had a lot of stick for it.  Normal, decent people have been 
bullied out of the debate. 
This is also identifiable in their criticisms of opponents as disconnected from the people:   
And UKIP is the only party that isn’t afraid to talk to them about 
[immigration]…Because when we believe something – we don’t go “are 
you thinking what we’re thinking”. We say it out loud.  
These labels allow the audience to recognise themselves in the UKIP electorate. The party 
wants to demonstrate its mass appeal and indiscriminate targeting strategy. These positive 
descriptions are put in opposition to the so-called disconnected career politicians guided by 
political marketing and artifices:  
One thing many have in common: they are fed up to the back teeth with the 
cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster, the spot-the-difference 
politicians.  
Patriotic appeals have been identified in the UKIP’s speech. A topos of history contributes in 
the text to Britain’s difference and exceptionalism.  
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
We have combined two forms of discourse analysis, functional theory and critical discourse 
analysis, to provide an in-depth inquiry into the way the leaders of mainstream political 
parties, including UKIP, have addressed the issue of immigration as part of their political 
communication. Using both approaches allowed to provide a comprehensive analysis and 
discussion of selected political speeches. To the best of our knowledge, only one other paper 
has combined both approaches: Cheng (2015) analysed two televised debates between the 
three candidates in the 2012 Taiwan Presidential Elections and focused on the way the 
candidates framed their arguments to gain compliance on contentious issues whilst deploying 
persuasive tactics to convince voters.  Although political parties will typically select their 
policy position strategically (Budge, 1982) the speeches analysed for this paper highlight a 
reactive response to an apparent surge in public concern regarding the valence issue of 
immigration. As Wagner (2012:65) observed “If incentives to engage in policy differentiation 
are present, then extreme positions can promise significant vote-seeking benefits and are 
likely to be emphasised by parties”. Although such convergence on a key election topic 
(Grofman, 2004; Wagner, 2012) would thus appear to be justified, in accordance with the 
concept of valence (Clarke et al. 2004; Stokes, 1963), by doing so the party leaders may have 
adversely affected their policy and issue differentiation (Kitschelt, 1994; Trent, et al. 2001). 
Indeed, although the functional and CDA process highlighted differences in terms of strategy 
and language, by reacting to the topic of immigration they may well become intrinsically 
associated with this policy area. Such association has the potential to develop into issue 
ownership (Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave, et al. 2014).  This potentiality is supported by a recent 
report by Katwala, et al. (2014) which indicated that people distrust politicians concerning 
the topic of immigration. 
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Whilst the UK political landscape has undoubtedly changed since the 2015 general election, 
epitomised by the resignation of Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg, the topic of immigration 
continues to be an emotive policy issue in an age of economic globalisation and transnational 
migration (Hollifield, 2000; Money, 1999). The high stakes attached to immigration are 
apparent in the levels of people’s anxiety related to both legal and illegal immigration, and in 
how the issue has been instrumentalised by various politicians and political parties for 
political gain. The recent Syrian refugee crisis, the appalling conditions of the migrants 
camps of Calais, and the polarised reactions of the British public to them are testimonies to 
this.   
 
One limitation of our research is the focus for illustrative purpose on only one speech per 
party, and further research is therefore needed to study more key speeches tackling the issue 
of immigration across the British political spectrum. Further research is evidently needed in 
order to expand our understanding of the political repercussions of immigration. For example, 
a longitudinal analysis of the speeches of the mainstream parties could potentially uncover 
their evolution in response to external pressures from the media, the electorate and other 
political parties. Indeed, such a study would reflect a central premise of a discourse analysis, 
namely to investigate “how, over time, social relations influence discursive practices which , 
in turn , influence social relations, and so on” (Charteris-Black, 2014:124). Such research 
would accordingly offer the potential to investigate the power relations involved the creation 
of a social reality where immigration and migrants are considered a problem (Charteris-
Black, 2014:129), discursively linked to a number of societal issues by powerful actors such 
as politicians and the media. Having demonstrated the synergetic benefits of applying two 
distinct forms of discourse analysis - functional (Benoit, 2007) and critical discourse analysis 
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(Wodak & Meyer, 2015) – to political discourse it is our contention that such a theoretical 
approach could be applied to  the aforementioned research topics. 
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